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Abstract 
 
The most interesting proposal in the draft European Model Companies Act (EMCA) 
concerning shares and the focus of this Article  is the recommendation to introduce true no 
par value shares, as they have been in use in the US for many years and were introduced in 
Australia, New Zealand but also Finland more recently. Contrary to what has often been 
assumed, the 2nd EU Company Law Directive does not preclude no par value shares. There is 
nothing in the wording of the Directive to suggest otherwise, and the reference in the 
Directive to shares without a nominal value is a reference to Belgian law, which has allowed 
true no par value shares in all but name since  at least 1913. EU member states could 
therefore  introduce such shares  even for  public companies. True no par value shares offer a 
far more flexible framework  in case of capital increases or mergers, but since under a no par 
value system there is no link between par value and shareholder rights, additional disclosure 
about these rights might be warranted under a no par value system. Traditional par value 
shares offer no protection to creditors, shareholders or other stakeholders, so that their 
abolition should not be mourned. The threat of new share issues at an unacceptably high 
discount is more efficiently countered by  disclosure and shareholder decision rights. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Model Companies Act (EMCA)1 that is discussed in this special issue of ECFR 
tries to deal with the regulation of shares in a comprehensive way, as detailed as a regular 
national Companies Act would. However, by far the most interesting and innovative proposal 
contained in the EMCA’s Chapter 5, dealing with shares, is the suggestion to allow 
companies to adopt true no par value shares. These are shares that do not represent a fraction 
of the company’s legal capital, neither from a legal nor from an accounting perspective. The 
rights attached to these shares, such as voting and profit rights, are consequently not 
determined by the fraction of legal capital they represent nor by a formally fixed nominal or 
“par” value, but simply by the articles of incorporation or the issuing conditions. The price 
paid for such shares in the form of a contribution is freely determined by the issuing company 
and the subscribers to the shares, and the contributions paid for such shares may be booked 
either as capital or as a reserve (“surplus”, as American lawyers often call it), at the discretion 
of the company. Under such a system, historical par values/accountable pars, i.e. the value of 
contributions paid for shares that have been issued earlier in the history of the company, play 
no role when new shares are issued. Such a “true no par value” system has been in use in 
                                                     
1 For the September 2015 draft of EMCA, which is the latest version that is public, see the website of the 
department of business law of Aarhus University http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-
company-act-emca/. For some background, see Theodor Baums and Paul Krüger Andersen: The European 
Model Company Act Project. ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 97/2008, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1115737, 
as well as a French version: Theodor Baums,  “Lois modèles européennes en droit des societies”, Revue des 
Sociétés 2008, pp. 81–88. See also the brief comments by Marco Ventoruzzo at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/14/the-new-european-model-company-act/.  
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many US states following the example set by New York in 1912 and was introduced in 
Finland in 2006. Belgium has had a system that is very close to a true no par value system 
since at least 1913.   
 
In this article we will explain the true no par value system and argue that it is more user 
friendly than the traditional system based on nominal value or fixed accountable par shares. 
At the same time doing away with the old system would not hurt the interests of any 
stakeholders. The traditional system has never protected the company’s creditors, and the 
protection it could offer shareholders is not only limited, but especially inefficient: it stands 
no chance of surviving a cost-benefit analysis which would show that other methods that 
hinder companies far less, protect shareholder rights at least as well.  We will also try to 
convince readers that a true no par value system is perfectly compatible with the 2nd EU 
Company Law Directive2, and can therefore be introduced by member states in public 
companies, too, without any amendments to this Directive.  Indeed, we will argue that 
especially after the amendments to many national companies acts in the Eurozone in the wake 
of the introduction of the euro, several such member states have in fact abandoned what little 
substantive protection the old rules on par value offered. Many member states make life 
unnecessarily difficult for companies by forcing them to jump through several procedural 
hoops when performing a capital increase, while at the same time these procedural rules do 
not protect existing or future shareholders or creditors in any meaningful way.   
 
Before we discuss this main theme of this article, we will first briefly sketch the EMCA’s 
philosophy concerning the regulation of shares and illustrate this with a few examples of 
specific rules that the EMCA recommends as good practice to national legislators.  
 
I. The general approach to shares in the EMCA 
 
Some of the main questions facing anyone regulating shares are:  
 To what extent should companies be free to determine the rights attached to the shares 
and should multiple voting rights be allowed ? Should shareholder rights be 
proportionate to the percentage of  legal capital a share represents? This latter question 
only makes sense in an environment where at least corporations (limited liability 
companies) have legal capital and where shares have a par value, which is still an 
important concept in Europe. What, in this context, is the exact meaning of the 
concept of “class” of shares and how should one deal with changes to class rights –
what, indeed, exactly  is a change to class rights?  
 Should shares have a par value or are true no par value shares along the Finnish and 
US model allowed? 
 What forms can shares take: is it a good idea to still allow bearer shares or should all 
shares be registered in someone’s name ? Shall one allow paper share certificates or 
even make them mandatory? What about book-entry shares (“dematerialized”, 
“electronic” shares) 
 Are there reasons to limit the possibility of articles of association or  perhaps also 
shareholder agreements to limit the free transferability of shares? Should there be 
                                                     
2 For the recast of the original 1976 Directive, as amended mainly in 2006, see Directive 2012/30/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in 
respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 74–97. 
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mandatory statutory limitations to the free transfer of shares in private companies/ 
companies that legally are considered “close(d) companies” ?  
 What is the value of the share register? Is it indicative of who is the owner of the 
shares? Or is it simply a means of making transfers of shares reliable against the 
company and third parties? Who should be allowed to consult the share register? 
Shareholders? The public in general? Public authorities? 
 Redeemable shares: certain countries allow either the company or the shareholder ( in 
certain company types) to redeem shares in the sense that the shares will be annulled 
and their value will be paid out; is it wise policy to provide for redeemable shares and 
under what circumstances? 
 
It would not be very interesting to summarize here the answers the EMCA has given to all of 
these questions. I will limit myself to a few general remarks in this section, before the main 
body of the text then extensively deals with the issue of true no par value shares.  
 
As indicated in the introduction to chapter 5 of the EMCA, the drafters of the EMCA take the 
view that national legislators should not introduce a numerus clausus for the types of shares 
and debt instruments that companies can issue: companies should be free to create types of 
shares or other securities not explicitly mentioned in companies acts or other legislation. More 
generally, the EMCA takes as its starting point and default position contractual freedom, i.e. 
the freedom for the articles of incorporation (and sometimes the issuing conditions of 
financial instruments) to deal with issues, including types of shares. Only when there are clear 
potential negative externalities, or when transaction costs could be substantially reduced, 
should legislators intervene through mandatory rules (and therefore the EMCA Group 
debated, among other things, whether bearer shares should still be allowed since they can be 
used to render certain fraudulent organisations more opaque; or whether shares with multiple 
voting rights should be allowed since they lead to a disconnect between power and financial 
investment and risk which could stimulate certain beneficiaries of the system to disregard the 
negative financial consequences for most shareholders of corporate actions that increase the 
power of the holder of shares with more than 1 vote). 
 
Another illustration of the philosophy that freedom of contract should prevail is that the issue 
of free transferability of shares should, according to the drafters of the EMCA, be left largely 
to the articles and shareholder agreements. In private companies, there is no need for statutory 
limitations on the free transferability of shares, but shareholders should be allowed to 
introduce such restrictions3. In public companies too, restrictions should be allowed, but of 
course a very far-reaching limitation of free transferability in the articles could under certain 
national companies acts lead to the conclusion that the company is not a public company at 
all.4  
 
A second guiding principle of the EMCA is that companies acts should only deal with the 
corporate law aspects of legal issues, and should not try to decide civil law issues, e.g. 
contract or tort law questions, or issues related to the law of estates5. This approach is 
                                                     
3 See generally s. 13 of Chapter 5 EMCA. 
4 In addition, for listed companies restrictions on free transferability would often be outlawed by listing rules or 
securities regulation. The EMCA does not deal with these.  
5 For the EMCA as a model law intended to be an inspiration for lawmakers all over the world, it would have 
been even more presumptuous than for the drafters of national companies acts to try and come up with “the best 
solution” concerning civil law questions, such as e.g. the interference between a shareholder agreement that 
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illustrated in section 11( 6) of EMCA chapter 5, concerning the share register. This provision 
makes clear that the person mentioned as shareholder in the share register is entitled to 
exercise the rights attached to the shares registered in its name, and recommends to adopt a 
rebuttable presumption that the persons mentioned in the share register are the owners of the 
shares. But how this presumption can be rebutted and how more generally legal ownership of 
shares is acquired and can be transferred, is largely left to general common law (contract law, 
law on moveable property, ..).  
 
There is one issue on which the drafters of the EMCA have taken a stance which is probably 
not bold enough. The EMCA does not contain a recommendation to abolish bearer shares. 
There is an international trend towards more transparency about share ownership also in 
private companies and bearer shares are of course less transparent than registered shares. The 
current European and world-wide debate about shareholder identification and particularly 
about identifying the ultimate owner/beneficiary of shares has to be seen against the 
background of an increased desire to combat tax evasion, corruption, money-laundering and 
financial fraud. In June 2013 G8 leaders agreed on a set of principles on beneficial ownership 
transparency. These were followed by FATF –Financial Action Task Force, the international 
anti-money-laundering standards body- “Guidance on Transparency and beneficial ownership 
(October 2014) and the “High level Principles on beneficial Ownership” adopted by the G20 
in November 2014.  More concrete and specific action was undertaken by the UK with its 
March 27 2015 ”Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015” which organizes a 
public register listing the beneficial owners also of private companies (as well as requiring 
that company directors are natural persons). Denmark has announced plans for similar 
legislation and the 4th  EU Anti Money Laundering Directive, adopted the obligation for all 
EU member states to organize a register where all corporate entities will have to file 
information about  beneficial ownership6. For the same reasons, there has been worldwide 
pressure on the use of bearer shares, and some member states have either, like Belgium, 
completely outlawed the use of bearer shares, or limited their use to public companies (where 
free transferability of shares is important and which, outside a system of book-entry shares, is 
easier with bearer than with registered shares). The EMCA does not deal with administrative, 
regulatory rules that impact companies but are not part of organizational law and therefore 
contains no rules on ownership transparency. The Group considered advocating a ban on 
bearer shares along the Belgian model, but in the end refrained from doing so because in 
several countries a deep attachment to bearer shares exists at least for certain company types. 
It remains to be seen whether this will survive the international regulatory tide. At the time of 
drafting the EMCA, the Group thought a balance could be struck between the desire for more 
transparency while still allowing bearer shares by a system of mandatory disclosure of large 
(more than 3 or 5%) shareholdings, as it has been organized for listed companies by the EU 
Transparency Directive. Such a system could be expanded to non-listed, including private 
companies, even though enforcement could turn out to be difficult. 
 
II. Towards the adoption of true no par value shares: the strange world of the existing 
par value systems  
 
1. The concept of par value and the differences and similarities between shares with 
nominal value and those without nominal value or with an “accountable par” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
limits the free transferability of shares and rules from the law of successions that mandate universal succession to 
the heirs upon the death of a shareholder.  
6 See art. 30 of directive (EU) 2015/849 of May 20 2015. 
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The truly innovative rule in the EMCA concerning shares is the proposed possibility for 
companies, including public companies, to use true no par value shares7. This is indeed one of 
the most important suggestions made in the EMCA as a whole.  
 
Every companies act needs to tackle the issue of how to determine the rights attached to 
shares. One obvious possibility is to leave this to the articles and/or issuing conditions, so that 
parties8 can agree to whatever they want. This approach is taken in the American Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and more generally in the US as a whole. This contractual 
freedom can be limited by legislators that nevertheless take this approach as their starting 
point, typically by provisions that either outlaw multiple voting rights shares or limit the 
multiplier for such shares, and by provisions protecting shareholders against subsequent 
changes to the rights attached to their shares or against transactions that, while not formally 
changing the rights attached to the shares, would negatively impact the power or the financial 
benefits attached to the shares (“dilution”).  
 
But shares traditionally also represent a part of legal capital9 and a second way of determining 
the rights attached to shares is to state that these rights will be proportional to the fraction of 
the legal capital that a share represents. This is the default approach taken by many European 
countries, among others France10, Germany, Poland and Belgium11. Legal systems that choose 
this route can then still differ in the extent to which they allow departures from this principle, 
or on the contrary make it wholly mandatory12.  
 
The “fraction of the legal capital that a share represents” is called its par value. This is a 
purely formal value that has nothing to do with the market value of the share, its fundamental 
value13 or its book value14, except in one extremely limited sense, namely that traditionally 
shares may not be issued for consideration less than their par value. 
 
Traditionally, most European companies acts required- most still do- to express this par value 
through a number, called nominal value15. Under systems that mandate companies to use 
                                                     
7 See section 5 Chapter 5 EMCA, and the general introduction to Chapter 5. 
8 The people setting up the company; or the company issuing the shares and the person subscribing to these 
newly issued shares.  
9 At least in companies that enjoy limited liability and need to have a legal capital.  
10 E.g. art.  L 225-122, see also  e.g. P. Le Cannu and B. Dondero, Droit des sociétés, Paris, Montchrestien,  ed. 
2009, p. 738, nr. 1123.  
11  Even in the UK this is the default rule, but it is clear that it is easier to deviate from the rule in the UK than in 
Germany, France or Belgium, among others. For a description of the UK approach, see e.g. Mayson, French and 
Ryan on Company Law, Oxford, 31st ed. 2014-15, p. 160-161. 
12 For instance, In Belgium voting rights in both public  (NV/SA) and private (BVBA/sprl) corporations are 
mandatorily proportional to the nominal value or accountable par of the share (art. 541 Belgian Companies 
Code, for public companies), whereas for profit rights such proportionality is only mandatory in private 
corporations (art. 238 Belgian Companies Code, stating the principle that in a private company all shares must 
have the same rights, except for non-voting preference shares). 
13 In the sense of the value the market should attach to the share if it valued the share according to the principles 
of a pricing valuation method as developed in financial economics (e.g. discounted cash flow method, multiples 
method, etc.). 
14 “Simple” or “uncorrected” book value is synonymous with net asset value, meaning net assets (assets minus 
debt and provisions) of the company divided by number of shares. This is of course exactly the same as dividing 
equity broadly defined by number of shares, in still other words adding legal capital plus share premiums plus 
retained earnings/reserves and some more exotic equity components that may figure in the balance sheet and 
dividing the sum by number of shares issued. 
15 In many countries, companies acts used to contain minimum amounts of nominal value per share, below which 
shares could not be issued. Most but by no means all countries have by now abolished this requirement, or  have 
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nominal value shares, “nominal value” and “par value” are synonyms16. Nominal value times 
number of shares then gives the amount of stated legal capital in the company. For instance, if 
a company has issued 1 million shares with a nominal value of 10, its share capital will be 10 
million (and conversely, if one reads in the accounts or articles that a company has a legal 
capital of 10 million and has issued 1 million shares and operates with shares with a nominal 
value, one can deduce that this nominal value must be 10 (unless the legal system under 
which the company operates allows one company to issue shares with different nominal 
values).  
 
Shares may not be issued under their par value (“no discount” rule)17. This rule is sometimes 
criticized as obsolete or unnecessary, but it is not and the criticism is misguided. One may 
criticize the concept of par value –indeed this article will- but if a legal system uses par value 
and especially if this par value is expressed as a nominal value, it is necessary to provide that 
shares may not be issued under their par value. The rule is self-evident and a normal 
consequence of double-entry bookkeeping. A nominal value system necessarily implies that 
when new shares are issued, the liability side of the balance sheet will show an increase in 
legal capital equivalent to the number of shares times their nominal value. If the contribution 
for such shares were lower than their nominal value, there would be a mismatch between 
assets and liabilities because the company would have received fewer assets than indicated by 
the increase of legal capital. This would violate accounting rules, would be misleading to 
creditors and would most of the time simply constitute fraud. The opposite situation, where a 
share premium is demanded above the par (nominal) value, and therefore only a part of the 
contribution is booked as legal capital, is not problematic as such.  
 
What is problematic is not the rule that shares in a par value system may not be issued below 
their par value, but other rules and practices usually found in such systems, namely that shares 
either by law or for practical purposes must all have the same nominal value, so that nominal 
value is fixed in time; that new shares can therefore not be issued at a price lower than the par 
value of the already existing (“old”) shares; and that companies who want to work around 
these rules for perfectly legitimate purposes –the most frequent situation being that they want 
to issue new shares at a realistically low price, reflecting the fact that book and market value 
of the existing shares are below their par value- must jump through all kinds of tiresome 
procedural hoops.  
 
Before we can discuss this issue fully, it must be pointed out that it is, however, feasible to 
express par value in another way than through a nominal value. Instead of using a number like 
                                                                                                                                                                      
set the minimum at such a low level (e.g. 0.001 dollar or euro) that it has lost all practical meaning. The amount 
need not be a whole number but may be a fraction in most countries. Germany is an important exception: par 
values there must be at least 1 euro and may not be fractions of whole numbers ( § 8 (2) AktG). But even in this 
most conservative of legal capital countries, minimum par value has been lowered to the low amount of one 
euro.  
16 See E. Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, Oxford, 2008, p.86 and L. Gullifer and J. Payne, 
Corporate Finance Law, Oxford and Portland, 2nd ed. 2015, p. 153, who expressly indicate this is the case under 
English law. The nominal/par value requirement under UK law can be found in s. 542 Companies Act 2006. 
17 M. Lutter, Kapital, Sicherung der Kapitalaufbringung und Kapitalerhaltung in den Aktien- und GmbH-
Rechten der EWG, Karslruhe, 1964, 159 points out, with an impressively rich list of references to national 
company legislation and doctrine, that the rule that at the moment the company was set up no issues below par 
were allowed, had been known in all founding members of  what is now the EU long before the 2nd Company 
Law directive harmonised the rule. In the UK, the rule was also ancient, see for example S. Girvin, S. Frisby and 
A. Hudson Charlesworth’s Company Law, 18th ed., London 2010, p. 179-180, including a reference to the 1892 
case which established or confirmed the principle,  Ooregon Gold Mining Company of India Ltd. V Roper [1892] 
A.C. 125.The principle is now established in s. 580 CA 2006. 
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“8” or “ 25 p” or possibly “0.33 £”, the par value of a share can also be explicitly expressed as 
a fraction. Instead of saying that a company with a capital of 1 million has 100.000 shares 
with a nominal value of 10, the articles could provide that the company has 100.000 shares 
“without nominal value” or “with an accountable par” or with a “fractional value” (the 
three expressions are synonymous, or at least are here treated as referring to exactly the same 
thing) of 1/100.000. Of course this is the same thing as saying that the shares have a par value 
of 10; it’s simply a different form in which exactly the same situation is expressed, once as a 
number and once as a fraction.  
 
The 2nd Company Law Directive, in its article 8, expressly (although indirectly) allows public 
companies to adopt such “shares without nominal value”. At the time of the adoption of the 
original 2nd Directive, such shares without a nominal value were only allowed in Belgium 
and Luxemburg18. The reason that article 8 refers to such “shares without nominal value”, 
which in their country of origin (Belgium) are usually called “shares with a fractional value”, 
is precisely because Belgium had allowed them for public companies since 191319.  
 
A system based on shares with a fractional value/without nominal value is exactly the same as 
the most inflexible version of a system with nominal values if three conditions are met, 
namely if the fractional value is fixed over time either because the law mandates this directly 
or because the law prohibits shares with different par (fractional) values, if as a corollary to 
this the number of shares may not increase disproportionately to increases in the amount of 
legal capital, and if the rights attached to a share are at least as a default proportionate to the 
fractional value of the shares. It also helps (but is not strictly necessary) that the fractional 
value has a minimum amount which has been set by law. As we will explain below, German 
law is paradigmatic for this approach. In such a case, the difference between shares with and 
without nominal value is purely formal and the only purpose of shares without nominal value 
seems to be that they can have par values which are not whole numbers and don’t have to be 
expressed anywhere so that if par value changes, documents that would otherwise have 
contained a number expressing a nominal value do not have to be formally amended.  
However, in spite of doubts among mainly academic lawyers (not so much among 
practitioners) that only disappeared in the mid 1990s, Belgian firms construed the concept of 
“fractional value share” in the Belgian Companies Act as something offering far more 
flexibility than nominal value shares soon after the introduction of such shares in 1913, or at 
least since the 1940s. These days, there is universal agreement among academics and 
practitioners in Belgium that this flexible interpretation is the correct one (see below).  
 
I will now first very briefly describe the rigorous German system of shares with and without 
nominal value to illustrate the traditional approach to par value in all its internal logical 
consistency, but leading to economic inefficiency (the system creates costs for companies and 
their creditors while only marginally protecting shareholders, so that on balance the system 
needs to be evaluated negatively). Like several other European countries, Germany allowed 
                                                     
18 Luxemburg originally copied the Belgian companies acts and their amendments and continued to do so until 
the 1990s, albeit that changes to the Belgian companies act were often adopted with some delay, sometimes 
never at all. From about 2000, the differences between Luxemburg  and Belgian corporate legislation became 
important as a result of a modernisation effort in Luxemburg independent of what was happening in Belgium.  
19  See the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2nd Company law Directive (only available in French, as far as I’m 
aware), COM (70) 232 final (available at http://aei.pitt.edu/8617/), comments to (then) article 7, p. 25: “La 
référence au pair comptable concerne les législations belge et luxembourgeoise qui connaissent les actions sans 
mention de leur valeur nominale. Le pair comptable s’obtient en divisant le capital social par le nombre 
d’actions qui le représentent, ou, s’il existe plusiers categories de titres, en divisant la partie du capital social 
représentée par une catégorie d’actions par le nombre d’actions de celle-ci.”.  
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companies to use “Stückaktien” in addition to traditional nominal value shares. But as I hope 
to show, “Stückaktien” are really nominal value shares by another name, the differences are 
almost purely formal. I hope to convince the reader that approaches like the German one do 
not protect in any way the creditors or shareholders that they are intended to protect, whereas 
they do make life procedurally and therefore unnecessarily miserable for companies. This will 
lead me to the conclusion that the EMCA made the right choice in defending the generalized 
adoption of a true no par value system in both private and public companies. 
 
I will then contrast the German approach with the far more flexible Belgian approach which 
led to the inclusion in the 2nd Directive of the concepts of “shares without nominal value” and 
“accountable par”. In doing so, I hope to show that without a par value that is fixed over time, 
the whole par value approach makes even less sense; and that the Belgian approach at heart is 
the same as a “true no par value system” that has long been common in the US, was 
introduced in the 1990s in Australia and New Zealand20 and was wholeheartedly adopted by 
Finland in 2006, the same year the UK refused to incorporate it in its new Companies Act, in 
the mistaken belief it was incompatible (for public companies) with the 2nd Company law 
Directive. There are no substantive differences between the flexible, today generally accepted 
version of Belgian shares without a nominal value and true no par value shares, the 
differences are only procedural. It is important to understand the Belgian system, because as 
already mentioned several times, it was sanctioned by the 2nd Company Law Directive, 
which allows “shares without nominal value” because Belgium had allowed them for decades.  
 
By discussing how the Belgian system operates during a capital increase, I will show that 
nominal/par value is not about creditor protection, but about protecting shareholders against 
dilution. But relying on disclosure and decision rights (requiring general meeting instead of 
board decisions) is a far more effective and cost-efficient way of protecting against 
shareholder dilution than using fixed par values. 
 
Next, I will explain that nothing in the 2nd company law directive militates against the 
introduction of true no par value shares. I will then finally describe the Finnish and RMBCA 
true no par value systems – a system that is also being considered in Poland. EMCA has more 
or less copied the Finnish approach. The article will conclude with some other rules 
concerning shares in the EMCA, rules that largely follow logically from the adoption of a true 
no par value system.  
 
2. The German approach: strict and internally consistent but inefficient 
 
The German Aktiengesetz  (law on public companies) offers companies a choice between 
nominal value shares21 and  shares with an accountable par, which it calls “Stückaktien” ( § 8 
(1) AktG). Nominal value shares must have a nominal value of at least one euro22 or a “full” 
multiple, that is nominal values must be whole numbers (e.g. 120) and must not contain 
fractions of euros (e.g. 3.33)23.  
 
“Stückaktien” (henceforth here also called “shares with an accountable par”) were only 
introduced after the introduction of the euro would have otherwise forced many existing 
                                                     
20 s.254C Australian Corporations Law, inserted by Company Law Review Act 1988; s. 38 New Zealand 
Companies Act 1993. 
21 “Nennbetragsaktien” in German.  
22 Lower amounts lead to shares that are null and void, § 8 (2) 2nd sentence AktG.  
23 § 8 (2) AktG,  last sentence: “Höhere Aktiennennbeträge müssen auf volle Euro lauten”.  
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companies to adopt shares with a nominal value that would not have been a whole number24. 
A look at the concept of these accountable par shares under German law quickly reveals that 
these are not true par value shares (“Quotenaktien” in German) but really simply par value 
shares whose par value has not been explicitly expressed25.  § 8 (3) AktG defines shares with 
an accountable par as shares without nominal value, and adds that the part of legal capital 
each such share represents may not be lower than one euro26 (just like the nominal value of 
shares with nominal value may not be lower than 1 euro). Moreover, all shares must represent 
an equal part of the company’s legal capital.27 It is telling that the part of the legal capital that 
such a share represents, is also called its “fictitious nominal value” (“fiktiver Nennbetrag”28, 
perhaps better translated as “assumed nominal value”). The whole set of rules is completed by 
a rule in § 182 AktG dealing with capital increases. § 182 (1) last sentence states that in 
companies that use “Stückaktien”, the number of shares must increase proportionate to the 
increase in share capital. A leading commentary states: “In this way, the [Act] protects the 
interest the existing shareholders have in a proportionate participation” [in the capital increase 
and hence in total share capital after the increase]29. The Dutch scholar Schutte-Veenstra 
gives the following example of what this means30: 
 Assume a German AG with a legal capital of 1.000.000 euro consisting of 10.000 
Stückaktien. The par value/fractional value of each share is 100 euro. The AG decides to 
increase its capital with an amount of 500.000 euro. As a consequence of § 182, the only 
possibility for this company is to issue 5000 new shares at a price of 100. It is not possible to 
issue 10.000 new shares for a contribution of 50 per share, because this would result in a legal 
capital of 1.5 million divided by 20.000 shares with a hypothetical31 fractional value of 75 
each. This would mean that the total share of the old shareholders in legal capital would have 
decreased from 100 per share to a hypothetical (because under German law not permitted) 75 
per share, as a result of a disproportionate number of new shares having been issued 
compared to the contributions being paid in (100% increase in number of shares whereas legal 
capital only increases 50%).  
 
The German approach is straightforward and clear and internally consistent: shares have a par 
value; all shares have the same par value (although classes of shares are possible, but not 
multiple voting rights); the rights attached to shares are proportionate to this par value; this 
value is fixed in time and therefore new shares will have to be issued at or above the par value 
                                                     
24 This was done by an Act dated 25 March 1998 as extensively discussed in Vetter, “Verpflichtung zur 
Schaffung von 1-Euro Aktien ?”, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2000, 193 ff. 
25 Cf. H. Ziemons, comments to § 8 AktG in Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar, Band I, 3rd edition, 
2015, Köln, § 8 nr. 3, p. 225.  
26 If it is a multiple, it must not necessarily be a whole number as is the case with nominal value shares, 
“fractional” accountable pars are  permitted, see H. Ziemons, comments to § 8 AktG in Schmidt/Lutter (eds.), 
Aktiengesetz Kommentar, Band I, 3rd edition, 2015, Köln,§ 8 AktG, nr. 12, p. 227 and Heider in Münchener 
Kommentar AktG, 3. Aufl. § 8 AktG nr. 81. If this were not the case, the whole purpose of the introduction of 
“Stückaktien” after the euro would have been defeated.  
27 § 8 (3): “Stückaktien lauten auf keinen Nennbetrag. Die Stückaktien einer Gesellschaft sinds am Grundkapital 
in gleichem Unfang beteiligt. Der auf die einzelne Aktien entfallende anteilige Betrag des Grundkapitals darf 
einen Euro nicht unterschreiten. (…)”.  
28 See H. Ziemons, comments to § 8 AktG in Lutter/Schmidt (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar, Band I, 3rd 
edition, 2015, Köln, § 8 nr. 12, p. 227, with  a reference to the government’s explanatory memorandum  to the 
Act introducing accountable par shares in Germany, where this expression was also used.  
29  R.Veil, comments to § 182 AktG in  K. Schmidt /M. Lutter (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar, Band II, 3rd 
edition, 2015, Köln, § 182 nr. 3, p. 2802: “Auf diese Weise schützt die durch das StückAG vom 25.3.1998 
eingeführte Vorschrift das Interesse der Altaktionäre an einer proportionalen Beteiligung”.  
30 J.N. Schutte-Veenstra, “ Denominalisatie van aandelen” in A-T-D. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. P. van 
Schilfgaarde,  Kluwer, 2000, p. 385-86.  
31 I write “hypothetical” to make clear that this is not allowed under German law. 
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of the already existing shares, unless there first is a formal capital reduction in which the 
nominal value of the existing shares is lowered; therefore “historical par value” plays its 
potential function in protecting shareholders against dilution. If a legal system attaches any 
importance to par value, it should adopt this complete set of rules, as Germany has 
consistently done. French law is similar to German law in this respect32, as is the law for those 
Belgian companies (a minority) who still choose33 to use nominal value shares34. UK law, by 
contrast, imposes the use of nominal value shares and has a no discount rule, but it is 
relatively easy to get around/deviate from the rule that shareholder rights are proportionate to 
par value and to create classes of shares35, so that in the UK it is even more questionable that 
nominal value serves any purpose at all.  
 
Our main point is, however, that even a strict regime along German lines does not protect 
creditors at all, and is of very little effective use in protecting shareholders against each other 
(the only real potential use of the par value concept). In order to clarify and underpin these 
statements, we will now first look at the Belgian system of shares without nominal value that 
inspired article 8 of the 2nd Company Law directive in order to be better able subsequently to 
demonstrate the inefficiency of the par value system as favored in e.g. German law.  
 
3. The Belgian system as inspiration for the 2nd company law directive 
 
Belgium has been a pioneer in Europe in allowing “shares without a nominal value” also 
called “fractional value shares”, since 191336, and contrary to what mostly foreign 
                                                     
32 For a description of French rules, see e.g. Ph. Merle, Sociétés commerciales, 16th edition 2013, Paris, Dalloz, 
p. 327 and specifically for proportionality between voting rights and par value, except for the system of double 
voting rights, p. 373-375.  
33 Usually these are private companies that, probably because of inertia rather than as a result of a conscious 
decision, have not yet changed their articles since a 1995 law allowed private companies, too, to use shares 
without nominal value (for public companies, the possibility had already been explicitly written into the statute 
in 1913, as indicated earlier). Some/most of these companies have probably not gone through a capital increase 
since 1995. I have no knowledge of systematic empirical research in this respect, but it is generally assumed 
among Belgian corporate law practitioners that hardly any newly set up Belgian company opts for nominal value 
shares. This fact in itself casts doubt on the thesis that  nominal values and the par value rules attached to them 
protect shareholders in a meaningful way. If they did, why would virtually no company founders opt into the 
nominal value system when given a choice?  
34 See T. Tilquin, “Les actions et parts sans valeur nominale en droit belge”, Bulletin Joly Sociétés, 1998, 738-
754 for an overview of the Belgian no par value system intended for a non-Belgian audience not familiar with 
the Belgian debate.  
35 See e.g. P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th 
ed. 2012, pp. 273 and 819-820 for  a clear description of how easy it is, as a matter of law, to create 
disproportionate shareholder rights under UK law.  
36 For public companies (NV/SA). For private companies (BVBA/SPRL) this has only been allowed since 1995. 
However, it can be argued that shares without a nominal value had always been allowed in Belgian public 
companies. Art. 35 of the original 1873 Belgian  Act on Public Corporations (société anonyme- naamloze 
vennootschap -type) simply stated: “Le capital social se divise en actions” (“legal capital is divided in shares”) 
and in practice this was apparently regarded as allowing companies to operate with shares without an expressed 
nominal value (nowhere did the 1873 corporations act mandate the expression of nominal value). A law of 25 
May 1913 simply explicitly confirmed this opinion, oddly without any indication of the reasons why this practice 
had to be legitimized. Doctrine pointed towards “pressure from practice”. Also, in Belgian doctrine prior to 
1913, no explicit distinction was made between shares with and those without nominal value, it was simply 
assumed that par value did not have to be expressed on the shares (if they were printed as certificates) or in any 
corporate document such as the articles. After the first world war, it was apparently rampant inflation that 
induced many companies to use shares without an expressed nominal value since nominal value figures seemed 
meaningless. There was also a political element to this: because of inflation, annual dividends that represented 
relatively modest amounts were often equal to or larger than nominal values, thus giving rise to accusations by  
representatives of “ordinary workers” that “capitalist pigs” were pocketing returns of more than 100% while 
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commentators regularly write37 based on the fact that such shares technically also have a par 
value, the way the Belgian system operates does lead to shares without nominal value that are 
emphatically not mere varieties of nominal value shares: their par value is not fixed, so that it 
is largely meaningless (see below). At the same time, Belgium has for decades had strict rules 
on the proportionality between on the one hand nominal or fractional value of shares (what 
Belgian scholars collectively call the “legal capital value” of shares) and the rights attached to 
the shares on the other. In 1934, a law was enacted that mandated the one share one vote rule 
in the sense that it was made mandatory to have voting rights attached to shares proportionate 
to the amount (percentage) of capital they represented.38 The system of shares without 
nominal value expressly permitted in 1913 raised no issues in practice until 1948, when a 
financial markets supervisory agency, the so-called Belgian Banking Commission39 critically 
commented on the practice it had observed among listed firms to issue new shares for a price 
below the par value of the existing shares, but with these new shares having exactly the same 
rights (to profits as well as voting rights) attached to them as the old shares40.  This could lead 
to possible financial and/or power dilution of the existing shareholders. This led to a first 
outpouring of debate about the issue, since it was clear that firms had been using this 
technique for many years and were convinced it was legitimate, whereas academic opinion 
was divided, in that some academics shared the doubts of the Banking Commission. The 
Commission mainly stressed that companies ought to draw the attention of their shareholders 
to the consequences of the transaction, and deemed the technique of issuing new shares 
“below par” -of the old shares- permissible as far as it merely implied a unification of profit 
rights attached to shares that had been issued for a different contribution, but had its doubts 
about the legality of such an approach when it came to voting rights, in view of the statutory 
rule (1934) mandating voting rights equal to the fractional value of the shares. The respected 
author Heenen pointed out that such a transaction could nevertheless be justified in case of 
losses41, i.e. where the actual book value of the existing shares was lower than their par value. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
workers were suffering from unemployment and low wages. The tax authorities, too, frowned upon these  
“enormous” paper gains. See for all this historical background M. Wyckaert, Kapitaal in N.V. en B.V.B.A., 
Kalmthout, 1995, 631-634, with further references to pre-world war II doctrine; as well as the seminal 
contribution by J. Heenen, “ L’existence et l’opportunité des actions sans valeur nominale dans les sociétés 
anonymes”, Rev. Dr. Int. Comp. 1950, 75.   
37 E.g. J. Rickford, “Reforming capital: report of the interdisciplinary group on capital maintenance”, EBOR 
2004, p. 229, approvingly referenced by L. Gullifer and J. Payne, Corporate Finance Law, Oxford and Portland, 
2nd ed. 2015, p.  154, footnote 56. Allow me to stress I do not want to single out these excellent authors for 
criticism, because there are many who have written the same as they do (namely that Belgian shares without 
nominal value are not “true” no par value shares; which is technically correct but substantially wrong), and also 
because the actual operation of the Belgian law is important to understand it’s true meaning, but hard to get at for 
those not reading French ànd Dutch.  
38 Meaning that, theoretically, shares with more than one vote attached to them were not only possible, but 
mandatory in cases where a company had issued shares at different “capital values” (nominal values, par values) 
(these shares would be considered different classes in many countries because of the different rights attached to 
them. Under Belgian law, they do not constitute different classes, since the different rights are proportionate to 
“capital representative value”, i.e. nominal or par value.). The 1934 law is the Royal Decree nr. 26 [an act of 
Government adopted in a crisis situation and therefore with the same legal value as an Act voted by Parliament] 
of 31 October 1934. What all this means is that it is arguably by no means certain that the Belgian legislator of 
1873, 1913 or 1934 ever had “true no par value” shares in mind. But as explained in the main text, the statutory 
possibility of issuing shares without an expressed nominal value was, at least since the 1940s but probably 
already earlier, used by firms to issue true no par value shares.  
39 Then the regulatory agency, set up in 1933, in charge of both banking supervision and capital markets, 
including prospectus rules. This agency is now called FSMA and its banking supervision role has been 
transferred to the National Bank of Belgium (and the ECB).  
40 Banking Commission, Annual Report 1947-48, Brussels, p. 72-76.  
41 J. Heenen, “L’existence et l’opportunité des actions sans valeur nominale dans les sociétés anonymes”, Rev. 
Dr. Int. Comp. 1950, 81-82. 
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Contrary to what the Banking Commission seemed to imply it is unclear that any company 
had ever tried to use the technique in a situation where there were no losses and there 
consequently had been no difference between book value and par value, the former being 
lower than the latter.  
 
The ensuing doctrinal debate essentially centered on the question whether par value in the 
sense of fractional value had to be determined taking into account “historical values”, i.e. the 
actual amount of the contribution paid by the subscriber to the shares42, or whether on the 
contrary a “pure accountable par” approach was permitted. The latter approach means that 
par value is simply determined by dividing legal capital by the number of shares, irrespective 
of the contribution paid for the share or the part of the subscription price initially booked as 
legal capital so that each share has the same rights attached to it unless classes of shares have 
explicitly been formed (the technique somewhat criticized by the Banking Commission in 
1948). As a consequence, when a company increases its capital through the issuance of 
additional, new shares for a price that is below the par value of the old, existing shares, the 
new shares will nevertheless have exactly the same rights as the old ones.  In spite of the 
doctrinal debates during the 1950s, firms seemed unfussed, and applied, without further ado, 
this “pure accountable par” approach43. After the 1950s the issue more or less died down until 
the early 1990s, when a law review article defended the “historical par value” approach44. 
This sent a cold shiver down the spines of corporate law practitioners and as a reaction a 
prominent practitioner-professorwrote the definitive article explaining why pure accountable 
par is not only perfectly legitimate but also the norm under Belgian law and why it is the best 
practical solution45. Since that article, the matter has not been contested anymore and both 
academia and practitioners (lawyers, accountants and auditors) unanimously apply the pure 
accountable par method, in which historical par value plays no role and it is possible without 
formally changing par values through e.g. a change to the articles in the form of a capital 
reduction to issue new shares for a price which is below the par value of the existing shares 
and automatically grant each share the same, newly equalized, par value and therefore the 
same rights.46   
 
Let’s further illustrate the by now traditional Belgian approach with the example of a capital 
increase with issuance of new shares in a situation where the book value of the existing shares 
is clearly below their “fractional value”. Suppose a company with a legal capital of 10 million 
that has issued, upon its formation, 1 million shares, each representing 1 millionth of legal 
                                                     
42 Under such a historical par value system, shares have no expressed nominal value, and new shares can be 
issued for a different contribution than had been paid for the pre-existing shares. But if new shares are issued 
against a lower contribution than existing shares, fewer rights (e.g. lower voting rights, lower profit rights) will 
be attached to them, proportionate to this lower contribution. 
43 See references in M. Wyckaert, Kapitaal in N.V. en B.V.B.A., Kalmthout, 1995,p. 639, esp. footnote 2232. 
These references to practitioners’ handbooks and in fact mainly to accounting treatises convincingly show that 
practitioners assumed the pure accountable par approach was the standard, normal approach.  
44 M. Wyckaert, “De bepaling van de fractiewaarde van aandelen zonder nominale waarde in de N.V., en van de 
aan deze aandelen verbonden Rechten”, TRV 1991, p. 381.  M. Wyckaerthas long since switched sides in the 
debate, see note 46. 
45 J.-M. Nelissen Grade, “La déterminitation de la partie du capital représentée par une action sans désignation de 
valeur nominale dans la société anonyme”, in Hommage à Jacques Heenen, Brussels, Bruylant, 1994, 337.  
46 See  e.g. T. Tilquin, “Les actions et parts sans valeur nominale en droit belge”, Bulletin Joly Sociétés, 1998, 
738. And indeed Marieke Wyckaert has now vigorously defended  the pure accountable par method, see M. 
Wyckaert and F. Parrein, “Kapitaal: een mythe van kapitaal belang?” in  Overzicht nieuwe wetgeving 
vennootschappen 2007-2011, (Jan Ronse Instituut ed.) , Kalmthout, 2011, p. (46), 83-96. Her published Ph.d. 
had already gone over largely to the pure accountable par view, albeit with some reluctance and reservations, see 
M. Wyckaert, Kapitaal in N.V. en B.V.B.A. , Kalmthout, 1995, 641-705.  
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capital and thus having an accountable par (par value) of 10. As a result of losses, the book 
value of these shares is only 8 per share, so in total 8 million. Suppose the company needs a 
capital injection in order to survive. It decides to issue 1 million additional shares. If it 
demands an issue price of 10 per share, the new shareholder overpays and will only be 
prepared to do this if he gets preferential rights. What a Belgian company will typically do –
and which it is allowed to do, whereas a German company, for example, could not do this in 
the same way- is issue one million shares for a price of (maximum) 8 euro per share. After 
this capital increase, the company will have legal capital of 18 million, divided by 2 million 
shares. For a legal second, the newly issued shares will have an accountable par (par value) of 
8, whereas the old shares have par value of 10.  However, immediately after voting the capital 
increase, the same general meeting will vote to unify these categories of shares, determining 
that each represents one 2millionth part of legal capital of 18 million, with each share 
consequently having the same accountable par of 9 and the same rights attached to them, 
since they represent an equal part of legal capital (they have the same “fractional value”). 
From an economic perspective, this is the same as having pure no par value shares, but with a 
procedure that’s more cumbersome: the general meeting needs to “unify” two classes of 
shares that existed for a legal second. The rules on changes to class rights –which basically 
imply that each class has to approve the transaction with a 75% majority within each class47- 
do not need to be applied to this situation, since the only two possible classes imaginable 
would be the existing and the new shareholders, but the existing shareholders have to approve 
the transaction at general meeting with a 75% majority anyway, and each subscriber to the 
newly issued shares will have given his individual consent to the transaction.  
 
Of course, the whole transaction could seriously dilute existing shareholders if the new shares 
are issued at a price that is substantially below the book value of the old shares48. In practice, 
this often happens, with the fully informed knowledge of the existing shareholders, who have 
to approve the capital increase and the subscription price with a 75% majority. They consent 
to this dilution because they realise it may be the only possibility, in view of market 
conditions, to get the shares sold and attract a sufficiently large capital injection that can save 
the company from even more severe financial distress. This capital injection in a company in 
financial distress is obviously beneficial to the company’s creditors. The converse could also 
happen: if the price for the new shares is set too high, it might nevertheless be possible to 
convince gullible investors to buy them in spite of the fact that their shares will immediately 
be diluted. For these reasons, the Belgian Companies Act is right in attaching great 
importance to disclosure: art. 582 of the Act mandates the board of directors to draw up a 
report detailing the way in which the issue price was determined, justifying it, and describing 
the financial consequences for shareholders of agreeing to an issue at the proposed price with 
a subsequent unification of all share categories49. This report has to be made available to 
shareholders well in advance50 of the general meeting that is being asked to approve the 
capital increase, together with a report by the company’s external auditor who has to check 
the reliability of the financial data in the board’s report and has to judge whether they are 
sufficient to inform the general meeting. A last safeguard is that this kind of capital increase – 
new shares issued below the par value of the existing shares- can never be performed by the 
board of directors using authorised capital51.  
 
                                                     
47 Art. 560 Belgian Companies Code. 
48 Or below current stock prices at the stock exchange, for listed companies.  
49 Again, these are not classes according to Belgian law. 
50 At least 15 days.  
51 Art. 606, 2° Belgian Companies Act. 
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This by now uncontroversial Belgian approach protects the interest of stakeholders at least as 
well as the more formal approaches in other European countries (with the exception of 
Finland), with Germany being the epitome of consistent but inefficient formalism in this 
regard.  
 
The question which stakeholder interests are allegedly protected by rules on par value, and in 
what way, does indeed warrants some attention. It is by no means self-evident that par value 
rules have any role in protecting a company’s creditors52.  
 
III. Do par value rules offer protection to any stakeholders? 
 
1. Creditors or shareholders as the intended beneficiaries –or both? 
 
It sometimes used to be said –and one may assume that in the 19th century, this was the 
original idea behind the concept of nominal value- that nominal /par value protects creditors, 
in that they could rest assured that shareholders would have actually paid in, or would at least 
have committed to pay in on first demand an amount corresponding to nominal value for each 
share. But this idea has never been convincing, and has lost all its power now that many legal 
systems that mandate nominal value allow companies to fix this value at a very low level – 
e.g. 1 penny. This has led at least one commentator, in a much–used and authoritative German 
commentary, to express serious skepticism about, in fact hostility towards, the idea of penny 
stocks53. I fail to see, however, how issuing, say, 10.000 shares of 25 euro each would better 
protect creditors than having 1 million shares of 0.25 euro. It’s true that if the nominal value is 
25, when new shares are issued, at least 25 euros of the subscription price –let’s assume it is 
80- will have to be booked as capital, and capital, of course, cannot be distributed to 
shareholders and in that sense protects creditors. If nominal value is only 0.25, virtually all the 
subscription price can be booked as a share premium, and rules on whether share premiums 
can be distributed differ from country to country, but in some countries they can be 
distributed as easily as regular retained earnings. What this makes clear is that creditors do not 
receive protection through nominal share amounts, but through rules on distributions and the 
real question is whether these are best governed by a balance sheet test, a solvency test, a 
liquidity test or some combination of these. In any case, in existing nominal value systems, 
capital is often a negligible amount compared to share premiums. Moreover, shares will of 
course not be issued, in the above example, for 25 euros when this is more than their 
economic value. In that case there will be either no capital increase –very much to the 
detriment of creditors - or the nominal value of the existing shares will first be lowered to an 
amount corresponding to the economic or to the book value of the shares through a 
cumbersome procedure of capital reduction, which offers no meaningful creditor protection 
                                                     
52 Nevertheless, several authors seem to think that par value rules protect creditors, beyond the obvious principle 
that if shares have a nominal  value or par value expressed as a fixed fraction of capital, the contribution paid for 
such a share should be at least as high as that nominal/par value. See for example  J.N. Schutte-Veenstra, 
“Denominalisatie van aandelen” in  A-T-D. Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. mr. P. van Schilfgaarde, Deventer, 
2000, (375), p. 377-78 where she writes that the choice between par value and true no par value shares 
determines the way company creditors are protected. In her view the use of fixed par values is linked to a system 
where creditors are protected through rules on the formation and maintenance of legal capital (p. 378). The 
Belgian an Finnish approaches prove that there is at least no necessary link. For the more or less opposite 
argument, which I find more convincing, that the current (French) system of par values has many holes in it 
when it comes to the protection of stakeholders (creditors or others), see J. Abras, “Augmentation de capital par 
apport en numéraire dans les sociétés par actions non cotées. Les faiblesses de la protection contre les abus dans 
la fixation du prix des titres nouveaux: l’exemple de la SA”, JCP Entreprise (La semaine juridique – edition 
entreprise et affaires), 2009, 1317 (issue 13, March 2009, p. 33-39).  
53 U. Hüffer and J. Koch, Aktiengesetz, München, 2014, comments to § 8 AktG. 
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but does impose and administrative burden on companies. In addition, the concept of par 
value as a creditor protection mechanism is unconvincing for the same reasons that rules on 
minimum capital are unconvincing, unless they are as sophisticated as capital requirements in 
the financial sector: the amount of minimum capital in unregulated, non-financial companies 
bears no relation to the actual risks created for creditors by the company; in the same way the 
amount of nominal value is purely symbolic.  
 
In American literature about legal capital –in which the concept of par value is invariably and 
rightly criticized54 - it is regularly argued that the original function of par value and the “no 
discount” rule was to protect shareholders against the company: a shareholder could rest 
assured that once he had fully paid up an amount equivalent to the nominal value stated on the 
share, the company could claim no additional contributions from him55. The nominal value 
therefore indicated the full obligation of the shareholder to the company, so the assumption 
goes. Of course this idea too deserves to be called simple-minded, since it seems to assume 
that shareholders will never be contractually obliged to pay a share premium, whereas often 
they are, of course.  
 
The real potential of par value- nominal value or historical par value- lies in the protection it 
can offer shareholders against each other in an intertemporal framework56, provided the rights 
attached to the shares are mandatorily proportionate to their par value, a rule that is not 
present in several legal systems that nevertheless impose the use of par values on their 
companies. This means shares must be issued for their “historical” par or fractional value and 
this determines the rights attached to the shares. However, the costs created by this system 
outweigh the benefits. Rather than forcing the company into a straightjacket when it issues 
new shares, shareholders can be protected through a mix of decision rights- the requirement 
for the general meeting to approve certain issues that could adversely impact existing 
shareholders- and directors’ duties – the duty of directors to determine an issue price for the 
new shares that strikes an acceptable balance between the interest of existing shareholders and 
the need to market the shares in order to attract financial means for the company, and the duty 
of directors to inform all parties involved (old and prospective shareholders) about the 
financial and governance impact of the issue share (threat of financial or/and (voting) power 
dilution of existing shareholders).  
 
We can explain the above by discussing the role of par value during capital increases, when 
the company issues new shares. It’s on that occasion that the difference between a nominal 
value system or system and a fractional value system operating with true accountable pars 
becomes most apparent.  
                                                     
54 The in a certain way magnificent handbook of B. Manning (and for the 1990 edition J.J. Hanks), Legal 
capital: being a concise practical exposition with illustrative examples, New York, 1990, while probably being 
the most comprehensive technical description of legal capital in American literature, is filled from start to finish 
with mockery of the whole concept of legal capital in general and par value in particular.  
55 Among many, see  e.g. J. Bonbright, “The dangers of shares without par value”, 16 Columbia Law Review, 
1924, p. 450. Between the 1920s and 1940s, the relative merits of par value and no par value shares were quite 
extensively discussed in American law review articles, see the references in J. Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the 
Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3, esp. p. 320 footnote 3.  
56 See already M. Lutter, Kapital, Sicherung der Kapitalaufbringung und Kapitalerhaltung in den Aktien- und 
GmbH-Rechten der EWG, Karslruhe, 1964, p.161 who writes, correctly, that under a system like the Belgian 
one,  the question whether the par value of shares without nominal value is determined  by the value of the 
contribution or, on the contrary,  simply by dividing capital by number of shares, has nothing to do with the 
problem of issues below par, but is “merely” a question of relationships between  shareholders. See also P. 
Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th ed. 2012, 
276, 11-5, who write that the “no discount rule” might be better understood as a  shareholder protection rule. 
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2. The role of par value when new shares are issued, and how legal systems get around 
par value’s undesirable effects 
 
When a company decides on a capital increase, chances that the book value or market value of 
the existing shares is the same as their nominal value are vanishingly rare.  
 
a. the lack of rules on share premiums undermines claims about stakeholder protection 
 
When book or market value of the existing shares is substantially higher than their nominal 
value, companies usually ask for a share premium when they issue new shares in order to 
limit dilution of the existing shareholders. Still, some dilution is  quite common, because in 
order to be able to market the shares and be sure that the company actually succeeds in selling 
them, a discount often has to be offered57. In any case, part of the contribution paid for each 
share will be booked as legal capital –namely the part corresponding to the nominal value of 
the existing shares- and part as share premium.  
 
Please note that those legal systems that allegedly attach so much importance to creditor and 
shareholder protection through legal capital, do not have binding bright line company law 
rules on share premiums. It may be a directors’ duty to demand a share premium in certain 
circumstances, but, understandably58, companies acts do not contain rules on this. For 
example, German, French or Dutch companies acts do not contain a rule stating that a share 
premium has to be demanded in case book value of existing shares exceeds their nominal 
value with a certain percentage. And once a share premium has been asked for and received, 
most companies acts are notoriously vague (or silent) about how this has to be treated59. In the 
UK, consensus seems to be that share premiums are more or less treated like legal capital 
when it comes to distributions60, whereas in Belgium share premiums are simply made 
undistributable by companies because otherwise they are taxed as profits. But a company that 
is willing to bear this tax burden, can, with a 75% majority vote at general meeting and 
nothing else (no creditor rights), decide to turn share premiums into distributable reserves. 
The point is that the lack of clear legal rules on share premiums makes the claim that a 
nominal value system protects creditors or shareholders sound even more hollow. Admittedly, 
it may be difficult to draft meaningful let alone efficient bright line rules about share 
premiums. But this cannot be used to support a nominal value system. It simply reinforces 
                                                     
57 One reason also being that both book values and market values as expressed, for listed companies, through the 
stock price on the exchange, are both ephemeral, volatile and a poor indicator of the book value and market price 
in the near future. Even in an unlisted company, book values often fluctuate substantially from one period to 
another, for instance because some reserves are distributed, provisions for risks disappear because they turn out 
to have been unwarranted or “revaluation reserves” are lowered because it appears they were founded on overly 
optimistic revaluations.  
58 Because it would be hard to draft bright line rules on this issue that are not inefficient, in that they limit 
discretion of the board and thereby force decisions upon the company that are either detrimental to the existing 
shareholders or to new investors, or to both in that new investors are de facto robbed of an investment 
opportunity (because the price the law forces them to pay for the shares is unacceptably high) and the company 
therefore does not receive the financing it is (sometimes desperately) seeking.  
59 For an overview, see J. Rickford, “Reforming capital: report of the interdisciplinary group on capital 
maintenance”, EBOR 2004, p. 919. The 2nd EU Company Law Directive contains no rule requiring share 
premiums to be treated in the same way as legal capital or indeed  in any other way; see, among many, E. Ferran, 
Principles of Corporate Financial Law , Oxford, 2008, 217.  
60 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th ed. 
2012, 268, nr. 11-8 writes that for capital maintenance purposes, share premiums have been treated in the same 
way as capital since 1948, with some exceptions mentioned in s. 610 CA 2006.  
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calls for taking directors’ duties seriously in this area, trying to make these duties enforceable 
by shareholders and perhaps in certain circumstances, creditors, and allotting decision making 
powers between board and general meeting of shareholders in such a way that shareholders 
can protect their own interests without totally undermining the technical workability of capital 
increases. The different ways legal systems handle these issues has a large or at least 
meaningful impact on creditor and shareholder protection. Strict rules about nominal/par 
value, on the other hand, have no significance at all for these issues. It is by now well known, 
and despite changes in both legal systems still true, that EU corporate law gives more decision 
making powers to shareholders than the US system, but makes the enforcement of directors’ 
duties by shareholders far more difficult, in practice, than in the US, which itself does not 
have an ideal system. This is a relevant difference in approaches to stakeholder interests, 
whereas as indicated the rules on par value make no difference. Indeed, most US states offer 
corporations a choice between par and no par value shares and many large US corporations 
still operate with par value shares, but with extremely small nominal values61; nominal and no 
par value companies are not perceived differently by creditors or investors.  
 
b. when a stock’s value is under water: fortunately creative lawyers are at hand to evade the  
par value requirements  
 
In case the book or market value of the existing shares is lower than their nominal value, no 
rational investor will buy new shares at the nominal value of the old ones, thereby being 
immediately diluted. This is probably the biggest practical disadvantage created by a system 
                                                     
61 Apple, a company not these days normally associated with outdated practices, suggested to its 2013 annual 
general shareholders’ meeting that it should switch to par value shares, with a par value of 0.00001 US Dollar. 
Apple had been incorporated in California and until then used no par value shares. But some US states in which 
Apple did business, like Delaware, calculated certain taxes and other fees Apple had to pay based on the par 
value of the shares and if a company used no par value shares, a hypothetical par value would be calculated by 
the State, sometimes leading to figures that were higher than they would have been if Apple had itself chosen to 
use par value shares with a low par value. See O. Thomas, “Here’s why Apple just said its stock should only be 
worth 0.00001 dollar”, December 27 2012 at http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-par-value-shares-2012-
12?IR=T (last consulted December 28 2015). The relevant part of Apple’s proxy statement - available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312512515422/d450591dpre14a.htm - read as follows 
(see p. 40-41 of the proxy statement): “Establishing a Par Value for the Company’s Common Stock. The 
proposed amendment of the Articles would also amend Article III of the Articles to establish a par value for the 
common stock of $0.00001 per share. Currently, the Company’s common stock has no par value. The Company 
anticipates that establishing a par value of $0.00001 per share will reduce corporate expenses and thus benefit 
the shareholders. Under the laws of the State of California, which is the state in which the Company is 
incorporated, a corporation may have par or no par value stock. However, some other states impose 
qualification or licensing fees on foreign corporations to transact business in such states based upon the 
authorized capital stock of a corporation. In certain states, the rates at which qualification or licensing fees are 
assessed differ, depending upon whether the shares of the corporation are with or without par value, with 
nominal par value shares being assessed at a lower rate than no par value shares, in some cases. The Company 
believes that adopting a nominal par value for its shares will, in some cases, result in the Company being 
assessed qualification or licensing fees on a similar basis as other companies that also have a nominal par value 
for their shares. Establishing a par value for the Company’s common stock will have no effect on any of the 
rights and privileges now possessed by holders of common stock. The Company does not expect that establishing 
a par value for the Company’s common stock will have any material accounting impact.” 
As “Business Insider” pointed out: “Apple has 940.7 million shares outstanding, so setting its par value at 
$0.00001—a thousandth of a penny—would put the technical value of the company's capital stock at $9,407. 
Apple's obviously worth a lot more—that figure just illustrates the degree to which par value has become an 
abstract accounting concept.” 
The proposal was adopted by Apple’s general meeting and Apple subsequently issued new shares with a par 
value of 0.00001 US dollar. See, for example an April 2015 employee stock plan where 50.000.000 shares were 
offered at a maximum price of 124.7 US dollar, but a nominal par value of indeed 0.00001: 
http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filingid=1193125-15-153187&cik=320193. 
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with fixed nominal or par values like the German one. Even in Germany, the system of fixed 
par values, implying that new shares cannot be directly issued at a price lower than the (same) 
par value of the already existing shares, has been criticised. One author wrote already in 1973 
that in case of capital increases, the no discount rule was “problematic”. He convincingly 
pointed out that creditors are not protected by the rule, since the rule does not imply at all that 
creditors will find at their disposal assets at least equivalent to the amount of capital. 
Creditors, the author contended, would rather see new financial means flow to the company, 
but this is made difficult by the ban on below par issues62. Unfortunately, more recent 
scholarship criticises this sensible point of view that goes to the heart of the matter, pointing 
out that it’s possible to solve the issue through a capital reduction preceding the capital 
increase, where during the capital increase shares are issued at the same par value as the 
existing shares63.  Apart from the practical and tax difficulties such an operation may bring 
with it, the capital reduction does nothing to improve the economic situation of the company 
or of its creditors, and therefore does not make the company more attractive for investors64 or 
creditors. True, in some countries even such a formal capital reduction, which does not result 
in any assets leaving the company, will have to be approved by a court, at least when creditors 
demands this. This is an excessive requirement since a formal capital reduction has no 
immediate impact on creditors whatsoever, only on future possibilities to distribute dividends 
under a balance sheet test along the lines of art. 15 2nd Company Law Directive. 
 
Under a strict par value regime, the company that wants to go ahead with the capital increase 
while the market value of its shares is below their value, has (probably a maximum, 
depending on the specifics of national company acts, of only) three possibilities. Fortunately 
these techniques allow companies to evade the meaning of par value, which proves the whole 
point that the concept offers no real protection to anybody. “Fortunately”, because otherwise 
companies in distress could not get their hands on the financial injections they need to 
survive.  
 
Suppose the company has shares with a nominal value of 100 but a book value of 80. The first 
possibility is that it calls a general meeting which decides on a (purely formal65) reduction of 
capital, thereby reducing the nominal value of the existing shares to 8066. Usually, this will 
entail a change to the articles and a formal capital reduction, or one of those. If the formal 
capital reduction entails that losses the company had incurred are set off against legal capital, 
this may have as a consequence, under certain national tax systems, that these former losses, 
now gone for accounting and tax purposes, are no longer available to be set off against future 
profits, a situation the company will regret. In any case, after the company has formally 
decreased the nominal value of existing shares to 80, it can then issue the new shares at price 
of 80 and with a nominal value of 80. The whole operation is a purely formal one and entails 
no safeguards for any stakeholders. True, the general meeting will have to approve the 
operation with the same majority as required for changes to the articles, but under European 
                                                     
62 Eckardt, comments to § 9 AktG in Gessler, Hefermehl, Eckardt, Kropff Aktiengesetz. Kommentar, Vahlen, 
München, 1973 p. 137, nr. 2.  
63 For example, with a clear description of the technical rules and references to other German authors who share 
her opinion, described as “the clearly dominant opinion”,  B. Dauner-Lieb, comments to § 9 AktG in 
Zöllner/Noack (eds.), Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, Köln, 2010,  3rd ed. Band 1. 2. Teillieferung, § 9 nr. 
13, p. 95.  
64 Eckardt, footnote 61.  
65 In the sense that no assets leave the company.  
66 See for this solution in Germany, U. Hüffer and J. Koch (eds). Aktiengesetz, München, 2014, § 9, nr. 4 (p. 52). 
The author calls this “the right way (“Der richtige Weg”), drawing the conclusion of [the need for] a capital 
reduction from the already occurred negative evolutions”. The moralistic undertone seems striking to me.  
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law the same goes for any capital increase (outside the limits of authorised capital) where new 
shares are issued.  
 
The second possibility is to henceforth operate with (at least) two classes of shares, each with 
a different nominal value, provided the legal system allows this, and consequently attach 
different rights to the shares. Companies usually want to avoid this in a system that mandates 
proportionality between (voting) rights attached to shares and their nominal value. It means 
operating with different classes of shares, which can get very complicated if one is dealing 
with a relatively old company that has gone through several capital rounds, each resulting in 
shares with different rights attached to them than the shares issued earlier. Calculating 
majorities at general meetings and knowing how to calculate correct dividends per share can 
get seriously complicated, even setting aside the fact that in public companies the lack of 
transparency about the financial structure of the company this entails is not appreciated by 
investors. Of course, one could argue that this difficulty can be eliminated through a merger 
of different share classes, for which company law contains procedures. These procedures will 
contain safeguards for shareholders, thus leading to the best of both worlds: after the 
unification of classes the practical problem of dealing with several different classes has 
obviously gone, and this has happened through a procedure which gave decision making 
powers to shareholders –it’s the shareholders, after all, that might be affected by “wrong” 
issue prices and that the rules on par value intend to protect. This line of argument overlooks 
that it’s far more practical and less cumbersome to protect shareholders through a system as it 
has been enacted in the Belgian Companies Act, namely allowing the issue of new shares 
without any reference to the par value of the old shares and having a general meeting decision 
–never a mere board decision- that decides that all shares have the same accountable par and 
therefore the same rights. Since this decision has to be taken with the same majority as the 
decision to increase capital, existing shareholders are sufficiently protected; in a change of 
class rights-procedure, they would be one class, the new shareholders the other class. This 
latter group, the new shareholders, is better protected than in a change of class rights-
procedure, since their individual decision to buy the shares at the proposed price with certain 
disclosed rights attached to them, amounts to the same thing as unanimous consent in a class 
rights variation procedure.  
 
On the other hand, if a legal system mandated nominal values but did not at the same time 
assume at least as a default proportionality between nominal values and rights attached to 
shares, how would such a system protect the interest of shareholders? Certainly not through 
the mandatory use of nominal values. If a legal system allows companies to operate with 
shares with different nominal values and at the same time leaves it at the discretion of the 
company to determine the rights attached to shares, with the possibility to deviate from 
proportionality between rights and nominal value, such a system does not protect shareholder 
interests at all. Any potential protection does not emanate from nominal value or even fixed 
nominal value as such, but only from accompanying rules that either exclude deviations from 
the proportionality principle, or give exclusive power to the general meeting, preferably 
deciding with some supermajority (i.e. more than 50% of the votes, and votes being 
determined not per head but proportionate to the percentage of legal capital a share 
represents) to deviate from this principle. It is striking that the British nominal value system 
does not contain these safeguards, as opposed to the French system, making it questionable 
whether the attachment of the British system to nominal value has any purpose at all. Shares 
in the UK must have a nominal value. A possible legislative switch to no par value shares has 
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been regularly discussed over the past several decades67, but has always been defeated, the 
last time during the discussions leading to the 2006 Companies Act. It was felt that the 2nd 
Directive did not allow true no par value shares for public companies and that it would be 
inconvenient to have a different system for private versus public companies. It was also 
argued that a switch to a no par value system would entail too much cost compared to the 
benefits. This seems not very convincing as long as at least already existing companies are not 
forced to switch to no par value shares but are allowed to soldier on with nominal values if 
they so prefer. Be that as it may, while UK companies must choose a nominal value for their 
shares68 and this value seems to be fixed for each specific share69, it does seem perfectly 
possible for UK companies to issue new shares with a different nominal value from the old 
ones70 but at the same time give them the same rights (voting; profit rights etc.) as the old 
ones.71 It is possible to issue new shares with preferential rights compared to the old ones72. 
As a rule, each share has one vote and profit rights are proportionate to nominal value, but this 
is only a default rule73, so that shares with the same nominal value can have different rights 
whereas shares with different nominal values can be awarded the same rights. This begs the 
question what the use of nominal value is under such an extremely flexible system. It’s not 
apparent. When discussing corporate law in the UK, one should also not lose sight of the fact 
that (in 2009) only about 11.000 companies are public companies74: all the others, i.e. the vast 
majority (more than 3 million), are private companies, in which legal capital and hence 
nominal value does not necessarily play any role at all. 
 
The third possibility under a traditional par value system to go ahead with a capital increase in 
a situation where par value is higher than the economic value of the shares, is to issue the new 
shares at a price equal to the nominal value of the old shares (in the example: issuing the new 
shares for a price of 100, even though the book value of the old shares is only 80). This leads 
to immediate dilution of the new shareholders75, which will only be acceptable to the new 
shareholders if they receive preferential rights, i.e. if their shares have higher profit or/and 
voting rights than the old ones, in spite of having the same nominal value. One could imagine 
an investor being prepared to pay 100 for shares with a book value of only 80 if the investor 
receives the right to preferential dividends and/or more votes per share than the old 
shareholders, enabling him to recoup his “losses” in future and leading him to value these 
shares at something like 100, in spite of their lower book value. This third solution is only 
possible in legal systems that on the one hand force companies to use nominal value, but on 
                                                     
67 For an overview, see E. Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, Oxford, 2008, p. 87-89. 
68 See section 542 (1) CA 2006. S. 580(1) contains the rule that issues at a discount to par=nominal value are not 
allowed.  
69 Even though it is possible to subdivide or, conversely, “consolidate” shares, so that a share with a nominal 
value of 1 £ can be subdivided into 4 shares with a nominal value of 25 p. But this does not change proportions.  
70 Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law, Oxford, 31st ed. 2014-15, p. 160.  
71 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th ed. 
2012, p. 273, nr. 11-11.  
72 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th ed. 
2012, p.820. 
73 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gowers and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 9th ed. 
2012, p.819.  
74 B. Hannigan, Company Law, Oxford, 2009, p. 476.  
75 Suppose the company initially had 1000 shares with a nominal value of 100 and therefore a legal capital of 
100.000. But at the time of the capital increase, the book value of the company, as a result of 20.000 worth of 
losses, is only 80.000, each share having a book value of 80. The company now issues 1000  new shares with a 
nominal value of 100, and demanding a contribution of 100 per share. After this operation, the  legal capital of 
the company is 200.000, but its book value is 180.000 (the losses have of course not miraculously disappeared 
because of the capital increase). The book value of each share will be 90 (180.000/2000), entailing a value 
transfer of 10 per share from new shareholders to old ones.  
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the other are flexible enough to allow deviations from the principle that shareholder rights 
should be proportionate to this nominal value. In which cases the question again arises what 
the protective function of nominal value or historical accountable par could be? The answer 
seems to be: virtually none.  
 
There is one seeming advantage from the angle of shareholder protection to using a par value 
system- either a nominal value system or a system with accountable pars. This advantage is 
what one could call the signalling or perhaps even the warning light function of par values. If  
the board of a corporation suggests to its general meeting to increase capital through issuing 
new shares below the nominal value of the existing shares, this can set off alarm bells with 
those shareholders, or a flashing message if one prefers, reading “Danger of dilution!”. But of 
course, as should be clear by now, such a warning system deserves to be called very crude and 
simple-minded to such an extent that it is misleading. Financial dilution will only take place if 
the issue price is below the book or market value of the existing shares, not if it is below their 
nominal value/historical par value. Conversely, an issue price well above par value may still 
seriously dilute the existing shareholders when book or market values are (much) higher still.  
Therefore, a “warning system” based on market or at least book values instead of par values is 
preferable. Of course, for the unsophisticated shareholder, nominal values are easier to 
understand than book or market values, but historical par values are at least as difficult for 
such an investor to grasp as book values, and one may assume that an investor who does not 
grasp the concept of book value is a hopeless case, not worth protecting; at least the whole 
legal system should not be geared towards these people who had better not make any 
investment decision themselves but should leave investment decisions to their advisors. It is 
true that power dilution, that is dilution of governance rights such as voting rights, may take 
place as a result of an issue below nominal value of the existing shares but not below the book 
value of those shares, if the new shareholders get the same governance rights per share as the 
old ones76.  But such voting rights proportionate to (non-historical) accountable par or simply 
equal for each share are a normal consequence of market conditions: if a company finds itself 
in dire financial straits and wants to solve these difficulties by asking for a cash injection, it 
will have to pay a price to either the existing shareholders or to new investors in the form of 
some influence for these investors that these would have only received at a higher price had 
things been going well77.  
 
IV. The 2nd Company law Directive does not outlaw true no par value shares. 
 
                                                     
76 Assume again a company with a share capital of 10.000 divided into 1000 shares without nominal value, 
therefore having an accountable par of 10.  Because of losses of 2000, the book value of the shares is only 8. The 
company now issues 1000 additional shares for a price of 8. After this capital increase its legal capital will be 
18.000 divided over 2000 shares and each share has an accountable par of 9. The book value of all the shares is 
also the same: 8 (16.000 divided by 2000 shares). No financial dilution has taken place. But each new share has 
one vote, can lay claim to the same pre-emption rights profit rights, even though the new shareholders only paid 
8 per share. But this a consequence of the fact that it was under the watch of the old investors, during a time 
when they had knowingly entered into a risky contract (namely bought shares in commercial company) that the 
losses were incurred.  
77 The situation is comparable to when a bank has a claim of say 10 million against a company and agrees with 
the company, who is in financial distress, to convert that claim into shares. Suppose the bank has only about a 
10% chance that its loan would have been fully paid back. It is a rare bank that would accept that this means that 
its claim would have to be valued at only 100.000 when it is converted into shares: precisely because of the risk 
associated with the company, the fact that the bank might want to influence the way the company is run and 
therefore wants a sizeable stake of total equity and because of the weak bargaining position of the company, the 
existing shareholders will have to accept dilution when the bank converts its claim into shares at face value. 
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The EMCA suggests that national company law drafters allow the use of true no par value 
shares. But is this not outlawed by the 2nd EU company law Directive? Many seem to believe 
so –including the majority of those drafting what would become the 2006 UK Companies 
Act- but they are mistaken. There are basically two reasons why the 2nd Directive does not 
stand in the way of a true no par value system. 
 
First, there is nothing in the wording of the Directive that explicitly outlaws true no par value 
shares. In fact, the Directive contains no provision whose specific purpose it is to mandate a 
choice by public companies between shares with and shares without nominal value, nor does 
it contain a definition of the concept of par value or accountable par. The par value 
requirement is usually deduced from Article 8.1, which states ”Shares may not be issued at a 
price lower than their nominal value or, when there is no nominal value, their accountable 
par”. But as such, this is simply the  “no discount” rule in the limited sense that shares may 
not be issued for a contribution that is lower than the part of legal capital they represent. It 
says nothing whatsoever about how “the part of legal capital a share represents” should be 
calculated, although  indirectly it makes of course clear that the part of legal capital a share 
represents is either indicated by its nominal value, or otherwise by its accountable par. The 
directive does not define accountable par, but the explanatory memorandum does: “The 
accountable par is obtained by dividing legal capital by the number of shares that represent 
it”. If anything this wording lends support to the thesis that there is no fixed par value in a 
system of shares without nominal value and that historical par value plays no role (in other 
words a confirmation of the Belgian approach, which was indeed the source of inspiration for 
the Directive).  
 
The best (but still unconvincing) support one can find for the requirement of a fixed par value 
is in article 3 (c) of the Directive. Art. 3 (b) says that the nominal value of shares must be 
indicated in the articles; 3 (c) then proceeds to say that the articles must indicate the number 
of shares subscribed “without stating the nominal value, where such shares may be issued 
under national law”78. This could be taken to mean that the only difference between  nominal 
value shares and shares without nominal value is that in the latter the nominal value is not 
expressed; in other words, we would be dealing with the equivalent of what “Stückaktien” are 
under German law. 
 
But grasping at the literal text of a section in the Directive that in fact deals with the minimum 
content of a corporations’ articles in order to invoke this as –very indirect- support for the 
thesis that true no par value shares are not allowed by the Directive not only reeks of 
desperation but more importantly is unconvincing in view of the undisputed fact that shares 
without (stated) nominal value were introduced into the Directive because they were  already 
in use in Belgium, and as explained, in Belgium such shares are not merely shares whose 
nominal value has not been expressed, they do not have a nominal value at all and their par 
value is simply the result of a division of legal capital by the number of shares, without taking 
into account the amount contributed for the share or any historical par value. In Belgium, art 
476 Companies Act (French version) states: “Le capital social des sociétés anonymes se 
divise en actions (…) avec ou sans mention de valeur”.Note that neither this French nor the 
equivalent Dutch text contain the word “nominal”, they only speak of “with or without 
                                                     
78 The French and German texts are the same: “sans mention de valeur nominale”, “ohne Angabe des 
Nennbetrags” but the Dutch text isn’t, there is no equivalent there of the word “stating” or “mention”: “aandelen 
zonder nominale waarde” the Directive says, not “zonder vermelding van nominale waarde” even though the 
latter expression is not uncommon in Belgian legal Dutch and is indeed the expression used in art. 476 Belgian 
Companies Act to indicate shares without nominal value.  
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mention of value”. This -that the Directive indirectly codified and therefore allowed the 
Belgian system of shares without nominal value- is the second reason why the Directive 
cannot be invoked to stop the introduction of true no par value shares. 
 
This finds further support in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal for 
amending the 2nd Company Law Directive79. This states (emphasis added-hdw): 
 
“Shares may not be issued at a price lower than their nominal value, or, where there 
is no nominal value, their accountable-par. This prohibition applies to all share 
issues without exception, not just to the initial share issue in the context of the 
company’s incorporation. This does not imply that subsequent share issues cannot 
be made at a nominal or accountable par value lower than that of a previous issue, 
as long as the price at which the new shares are issued complies with the above 
mentioned obligation.”80 
 
This statement is made as part of a summary of what the Commission saw as the main 
principles of the existing, original Directive. This confirms that, in the eyes of the 
Commission, the Directive never contained a rule forcing member states to take “historical 
par values” into account. In other words, the Belgian approach to shares without nominal 
value whereby par value of such shares is simply obtained by dividing legal capital as it is 
after the capital increase by total number of shares issued and still in existence in the whole 
history of the company, is compatible with the Directive. In such a system there is no rule that 
the number of shares may only increase proportionate to the increase in legal capital, as 
Germany has in § 182 AktG and therefore the formal equality between old and new shares is 
not maintained; par values fluctuate (without formal capital reductions). If historical par value 
is not a mandatory feature of shares without nominal value, then such shares are really 
different from nominal value shares, they are not merely the equivalent of German 
“Stückaktien” but are equivalent in all but name to true no par value shares.  
 
V. True no par value systems: EMCA following Finland81 and common law countries 
outside the UK  
 
In a true no par value system, there is by definition no par value and therefore shares have no 
value that relates to legal capital. In other words, shares do not represent any kind of fraction 
of legal capital. They are therefore simply issued at a price that is appropriate under the 
circumstances –meaning of course it was acceptable to both the company and the subscribers- 
and the rights attached to them (profit rights, voting rights, ..) are determined in the issuing 
                                                     
79 Which would lead to the 2006 amendment of the 2nd Company Law Directive, Directive 2006/68/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC as regards 
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital OJ L 264, 
25.9.2006, p. 32–36.  
80  Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital, COM (2004) 370 Final, 29 October 2004, p. 3. (see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/191922) 
81 On the Finnish system, see esp. M. Airaiksinen, “The Delaware of Europe? - financial instruments in the new 
Finnish Companies Act” in P. Krüger Andersen and K.E. Sörensen (eds.), Company Law and Finance, 
Copenhagen, 2008, p. 313. Prof. Matti Sillanpää of the University of Türku first drew the attention of myself and 
of the whole EMCA group to the Finnish approach and it heavily influenced the drafting of Chapter 5 of the 
EMCA.  
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conditions or/and the articles of incorporation, without there being any connection with the 
percentage of legal capital the share represents. Normally, proposals about the issue price and 
the rights attached to the shares are made by the directors and usually but not always have to 
be approved on behalf of the company by the general meeting of shareholders.  
 
The concepts of share premium and issues below par are meaningless in a no par value 
system. 
 
Contributions for shares are booked either as capital or as a distributable or undistributable 
reserve at the discretion of the company.  
 
Different issue prices in different capital rounds do neither lead to different classes of shares –
since the rights attached to the share bear no relationship with the issue price or non-existing 
par value- nor to procedures to adapt par value of existing shares to their real value before 
new shares can be issued at this same (new) par value. 
 
1. The Finnish and US approaches 
 
The approach taken in EMCA has to a large extent been inspired by the new Companies Act 
that entered into force in Finland on September 1st 2006. The centerpiece of that reform was 
the introduction of true no par value shares82. The Finnish government justified this reform by 
pointing out that nominal value bears no relation to any real value of shares, may create 
confusion, does not effectively help guarantee equality between shareholders, restricts the 
possibility to issue new shares when the existing ones have an economic value below their 
nominal/par value and does not protect creditors, other than through the basic principle that 
subscribers can be forced to pay up the nominal value of the share83.  
 
The Finnish government also pointed out that article 8 of the 2nd Directive is not an obstacle 
to true no par value shares, contrary to what UK and Swedish authorities had contended when 
they were considering the introduction of such shares in the framework of their own company 
law reforms and justifies this mainly by a reference to the explanatory memorandum to the 
Amendment to the 2nd Directive that we cited above. 
 
The Finnish approach does not do way with the concept of legal capital, and even retains a 
minimum capital for private companies (2500 euro). Also, companies can still choose to work 
with nominal value shares –if they do so, all shares must have the same nominal value. 
 
Companies in Finland have restricted and unrestricted equity (= distributable reserves/retained 
earnings/surplus). Share capital and the “fair value reserve” are restricted equity.  When new 
shares are issued, the company decides which part of the issue price will be booked as 
restricted equity and which as unrestricted equity. If no explicit decision is taken by the 
company, the whole subscription price will be booked as share capital84. But the company can 
decide to issue new shares and credit all of the issue price to unrestricted reserves85. 
                                                     
82 See M. Airaiksinen, “The Delaware of Europe? - financial instruments in the new Finnish Companies Act” in 
P. Krüger Andersen and K.E. Sörensen (eds.), Company Law and Finance, Copenhagen, 2008, p. 311-326. 
83 See p. 20-21 of Government Proposal 109/2005 for a new Companies Act, provided to me in English 
translation by prof. Matti Sillanpää of the University of Türku.  
84 Chapter 9, s 6 (1) Finnish Companies Act 2006. 
85 M. Airaiksinen, “The Delaware of Europe? - financial instruments in the new Finnish Companies Act” in P. 
Krüger Andersen and K.E. Sörensen (eds.), Company Law and Finance, Copenhagen, 2008, p. 315 
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By adopting this system, Finland was the first European country resolutely following in the 
footsteps of the US, where the state of New York was the first to allow companies to issue no 
par value shares, in 1912. Almost all states now allow corporations to choose between par 
value and no par value shares86. Delaware is among those, and the concept of legal capital still 
exists in Delaware.  The current Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) has gone further 
(following California which made this step in the 1970s) and has completely removed any 
even formal legal relevance of the par value concept, e.g. for distributions87. One consequence 
of the predominance of no par value shares in the US, is that in many states these can be 
issued in exchange for property or specified services without a specific price or value being 
put on these contributions; a declaration that such property/services is sufficient consideration 
is sufficient for corporate law purposes, even though the contributions will still have to be 
valued in the accounts of the corporation88. The issue price for no par value shares is set 
discretionary by the board89, within equitable limits. That is, the board has a fiduciary duty to 
fix a reasonable price90. Basically, the board may not cause unwarranted shareholder dilution 
in general, nor may price differences for shares that basically share the same features cause 
one group of shareholders to be diluted to the benefit of others or new subscribers91. § 154 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law makes clear that the board determines which part of 
the issue price will be booked as legal capital (and if it fails to do so, the whole price will be 
considered capital). The rights attached to the shares are freely determined by the company, 
without reference to legal capital, and are equal unless a preference has been awarded to 
certain shares92. Under Delaware law, the board even has quite broad powers to change the 
rights attaching to shares after they have been issued93. This latter type of provision has not 
been copied in the EMCA since it would run fundamentally counter to the bedrock of 
European views on the allocation of powers between the board and shareholders94.  
 
2. The EMCA: consequences of adopting the Finnish model for determining the rights 
attached to shares 
 
                                                     
86 For all that precedes in this paragraph, see e.g. J. Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd 
edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3, § 16:15, p. 315-16. 
87 As is well-known distributions are mainly subject under this system to  a simplified balance sheet test, namely 
the rule that no distribution may reduce assets below the value of liabilities; and a solvency test: no distribution 
should render the corporation unable to pay its debts as they mature in the ordinary course of business. See J. 
Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3, p. 357 with further 
references. For the tests see also MBCA §§ 140(6) and 6.40 (2008). There is no legal capital concept to limit the 
distribution of assets, and the balance sheet test is not a net asset test in the vein of art. 15 of the 2nd EU 
Company Law Directive.  
88 See J. Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3, p. 321. 
89 For Delaware, see §§ 150 and 153 (b) from which it appears that the board essentially  determines the 
consideration that is acceptable for the corporation for the shares and determines the issue price.  
90 J. Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3,  § 16:21, p. 337. 
91 On this and more generally equitable limits to price setting under the no par value system, see e.g. See J. Cox 
and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 2010, Vol. 3, p. 337-341; specifically for 
Delaware, see Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law. Fundamentals 2010 edition,  Wolters Kluwer, § 
161.2, p. 394-395.   
92 See Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law. Fundamentals 2010 edition,  Wolters Kluwer, § 151.4.1, 
p. 335.The principle can be deduced from  § 151 (a) DGCL.  
93  See Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law. Fundamentals 2010 edition,  Wolters Kluwer, p. 341.  
94 Broadly speaking and necessarily simplifying, in European corporate law the articles can only be changed by 
shareholders, everything having to do with legal capital (therefore) can only be decided by the shareholders and 
the same goes for shareholder rights (embedded in shares representing legal capital or not). By-laws that have a 
“lesser” status than the articles do not really exist in regular corporations.  
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As indicated, the EMCA approach of no par value shares has largely been inspired by the 
Finnish Companies Act. Section 5(1) EMCA offers companies a choice between using 
nominal value shares along traditional lines and no par value shares –it seemed unwise to 
allow companies to operate with the two types of shares simultaneously. In case of no par 
value shares, the company determines the issue price and determines how much of this price 
will be booked as capital or as a reserve (section 5(3) EMCA). It’s at the discretion of the 
same company body to determine which part of the subscription price that is not booked as 
capital receives the status of restricted reserve and which part is booked as unrestricted, i.e. 
distributable reserve. The rights attached to the  no par value shares are in principle equal- one 
vote per share (s. 6 (1) of Chapter 5 of EMCA) and equal profit rights (s. 7(3) chapter 5 
EMCA) being the default rule- but deviations are possible in the articles(see below).  
 
But EMCA also aims for consistency. A company would still be allowed to choose for using 
nominal value shares. If a company opts into a nominal value system, the rights attached to 
the shares must be proportionate with  that nominal value. Such a company may create 
different classes of shares with different nominal values, but few would do that because of the 
practical difficulties it creates.   
 
The advantages of a system such as proposed in the EMCA are many95. The first  and most 
important one has already been mentioned several times: since historical par values play no 
role, shares in a capital increase can simply be issued for a price that is reasonable under the 
circumstances. There is no need to first change the nominal or par value of the existing shares 
before issuing new shares when the market or book value is below the value for which they 
were issued, and  the  issue price, however it is booked, has no impact on the rights attached 
to the shares so that there is neither a need to create classes to take into account different 
“values” of shares nor a need to “unify” classes or groups of shares as far as rights are 
concerned after they have been issued for different subscription prices. In mergers and similar 
operations, there is no need to “harmonize” nominal or par values of the shares of the 
companies (whose shareholders are) involved in the share swap. Share capital does not have 
to equal the sum of any par values. All this prevents shareholders who under a nominal value 
system would have to vote on these changes from unreasonably blocking a transaction which 
would be beneficial or even necessary for the company, e.g. to assure its survival when it is in 
financial distress but a new financier has been found who is ready to inject equity.   
 
The number of shares can be changed (increased or decreased) without new contributions or 
capital reductions, but also without any internal movement between items in the accounts (e.g. 
without incorporation of retained earnings into legal capital). Conversely, new contributions 
need not lead to the issuing of new shares. More generally, because under a no par value 
system there is no link between legal capital and shares, shares can be issued or their number 
decreased without changes to legal capital in far more circumstances and far easier than under 
a nominal/par value system. 
 
                                                     
95 See among quite a few others J. Cox and T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations, 3rd edition,  West, 
2010, Vol. 3, 320-21; M. Airaiksinen, “The Delaware of Europe? - financial instruments in the new Finnish 
Companies Act” in P. Krüger Andersen and K.E. Sörensen (eds.), Company Law and Finance, Copenhagen, 
2008, 314-15; H.Y.Kee and L.L. Luh, “The par value of shares: an irrelevant concept in modern company law”, 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies,1999, p.562-568. A quite extensive evaluation of the merits and 
disadvantages of both a par value and no par value system can also be found in e.g. The Australian March 1990  
Companies and Securities Law Review Committee Discussion Paper no 10, Shares of no par value and partly paid 
shares, available at http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/resources/cslrc/cslrc_discussion_paper_no_10.aspx. 
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Another consequence of the EMCA favouring a no par value system, is that the rights 
attached to shares are freely determined by the company (articles, issuing conditions). This is 
more generally in line with the fundamental principle underpinning the whole of the EMCA 
that mandatory law is only necessary in order to save transaction costs or combat externalities 
and that therefore, the starting point in all matters should be freedom for the articles of 
incorporation to deal with issues. After extensive debate, the EMCA group has held onto this 
line with regards to voting rights attached to shares. Non-voting shares are allowed96, without 
it being mandatory that the lack of voting rights is compensated by preferential profit rights. 
Even priority shares are allowed, meaning shares that give certain special, exclusive owners to 
certain shareholders, such as the veto powers or the right to take certain decisions without the 
support of other shareholders. An example of the latter could be that a certain group of 
shareholders or even an individual shareholder is allowed to appoint (not just nominate) a 
director irrespective of the vote at the general meeting. In public companies this may not be 
ideal from a governance perspective and in listed companies investors will normally not 
accept such practices, insofar as they are allowed by listing rules. But EMCA was also and 
perhaps in reality mainly drafted with private companies in mind, and there contractual 
freedom should prevail so that the governance structure can be tailor-made to the needs of the 
parties involved.  
 
As a consequence of this approach, the EMCA does, of course, allow multiple voting rights97. 
Under Commissioner McCreevy, the EU Commission considered the issue of 1 share 1 vote 
and for a while considered making this rule mandatory for listed companies. In 2007 several 
studies of the issue, commissioned by the EU Commission, were published98 and based on 
these and the feedback from stakeholders, the Commission decided to drop its plan for 
legislation in the area. Even for listed companies, no convincing rationale could be found for 
the across the board enforcement of a one share one vote rule, at least not as long as 
deviations from one share one vote had been introduced before the company went public. 
 
Many within the EMCA Group were in favour of the French system of loyalty shares: 
shareholders who keep their shares for certain period, get double voting rights, but no more, 
and these double voting rights are attached to a shareholder, not to the shares. Hence, the 
double voting rights are lost upon transfer of the shares, so that the beneficiary of double 
voting rights cannot cash in the extra control rights such shares bestow upon him99. In other 
words, multiple voting rights are allowed and the EMCA contains no principle of equality 
between shareholders in this regard.  Contrary to the change effected by the “Loi Florange” in 
France100, EMCA recommends that multiple voting rights would only attach to shares if the 
company explicitly opted into the system101.   
                                                     
96 S. 6 (2) Chapter 5 EMCA. 
97 S. 6 (1) Chapter 5 EMCA allows the articles to deviate from the one share one vote rule, without limitations 
concerning the multiplier which in the view of the EMCA Group are only required in listed companies. Multiple 
voting rights remain a fascinating issue but it would of course have required a separate article to deal with the 
issues with any degree of thoroughness. 
98 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/shareholders/indexb_en.htm. 
99 For a brief description of the French rules, see e.g. Ph. Merle, Sociétés commerciales, 16th edition 2013, Paris, 
Dalloz, p.374-375. 
100 Loi n° 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l’économie réelle (loi Florange), French OJ 1 April 
2014, 6227. 
101 The “loyalty double voting rights” system has received some renewed attention over the past few years 
because of the controversial changes made to the French system by the “Loi Florange” (previous footnote) and 
the introduction of a similar system in Italy, where the initial version of the law –which was apparently 
introduced after Fiat incorporated in the Netherlands, a jurisdiction which is lenient towards anti-takeover 
defences, on the occasion of its merger with Chrysler- was immediately repealed after vehement protest by some 
28 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our conclusion can be brief. National legislators should follow the EMCA’s recommendation 
to introduce no par value shares on the Finnish model. The 2nd directive is, contrary to what 
is often alleged and what UK and Swedish company law reformers clearly believed, not an 
obstacle. As long as one does not force at least private companies to switch to the new no par 
value system, but allows them to soldier on with nominal value shares if they so wish, or 
gives them a long grace period, there are no serious cost objections and the Belgian example 
shows that it is completely unproblematic to allow a nominal value and a no par value system 
to coexist, depending on companies’ choices. The current rules on par value do not protect 
stakeholders –neither creditors nor shareholders- but may on the contrary have a negative 
impact on the ease with which firms in financial distress are able to raise new finance. By 
mandating supermajorities and sometimes individual creditor consent for the issue of new 
shares below par of the old ones, the current rules may even give an opportunity to a 
relatively small group of shareholders to take the company hostage: out of fear of being 
diluted they could block the capital increase that could save the company and the economic 
substance (including often employment) it represents. The objection that such abuses can be 
combatted using doctrines like “abuse of minority voting power” or “unfair prejudice” is not 
very convincing in view of the very limited scope of these doctrines, the burden of proof they 
impose on plaintiffs and the simple fact that there is often not enough time to go to court 
when a company is in distress and wants to raise finance to avoid total collapse. 
 
In a no par value system, one has to rely more on directors’ duties than on any bright line rule 
related to par value to make sure that an acceptable issue price for new shares is determined. 
It is no doubt true that enforcement of directors’ duties is not a forte of European company 
law, certainly not on the continent. But this does not make the bright line rules that refer to 
par value, such as the “no discount” rule, any more attractive. These rules are unable to 
protect stakeholders in any meaningful way, and even in a par value system, the discretion of 
directors to de facto determine the issue price is large.   
 
It is therefore to be hoped that Europe’s national legislators, when they next set out to reform 
their national companies acts, get rid of the cobwebs of par value that currently obstruct a 
clear view of what is happening to the company and relations between existing and new 
shareholders when it raises new equity102.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
institutional investors. For an overview of the rules and the debate, see J. Delvoie and C. Clottens, 
“Accountability and short-termism: some notes on loyalty shares”, Law and Financial Markets Review, Vol. 
9:1,2015, p. 19-28.  
102 I’m part of a committee drafting a completely new Belgian Companies Act that is suggesting to do just that 
for Belgian companies- for private companies the intention is even to get rid of the concept of legal capital (not 
just of minimum capital). In 2017 it should be clear whether the Minister of Justice will be successful in getting 
this reform through Belgian Parliament. This 4 person committee tries, with the help of various other experts and 
after extensive consultations with stakeholders,  to implement the ideas of the Belgian Center for Company Law, 
a group of originally 14 company law professors, one of whom, Koen Geens, has in the meantime become 
Belgium’s Justice minister. For some of the key documents concerning the Center’s activities including a 
summary of the key proposals now being transformed into a draft bill, see http://www.bcv-cds.be/ (Dutch and 
French only). In Poland, a draft law was published in a law review in 2010 which would have introduced no par 
value shares, but this law was not/has not yet been adopted: A. Opalski, K. Oplustil, T. Siemiqtkowski, S. 
Soltysinski, A. Szumanski, J. Warchol, “Projekty reformy struktury majatkowej spolki z o.o.”, Przeglad Prawa 
Handlowego 2010, nr 12, p. 5. I thank dr. Adam Opalski for providing me with the paper in English about this 
draft bill which he presented at the September 2012 Cologne meeting of the ECLE Group.  
